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INTRODUCTIONI
* Professor of Law and Director, Online Mental Disability Law Pro-
gram, New York Law School; Director, International Mental Disability Law
Reform Project, Justice Action Center. Portions of this paper were presented at
the biennial congress of the International Academy of Law and Mental Health,
July 2009 (NYC), at the annual meeting of the Human Dignity and Humiliation
Network, December 2011 (NYC), at the Prato Workshop on Coercive Care:
Law and Policy, sponsored by the Monash University Centre for the Advance-
ment of Law and Mental Health, May 2012 (Prato, Italy), and the Association of
American Law Schools' annual meeting, January 2013 (New Orleans, LA). The
author wishes to thank Alison Lynch for her helpful research and editorial as-
sistance.
1. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, "There Are No Trials Inside the
Gates of Eden": Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in
COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW AND POLICY 193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian
Freckelton eds., 2013).
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One of the most important developments in the past two decades in
the way that criminal defendants with mental disabilities are
treated in the criminal process has been the creation and the expan-
sion of mental health courts, one kind of "problem-solving court."2
There are now, according to the Council of State Governments'
Justice Center, over 300 such courts in operation in the United
States, some dealing solely with misdemeanors,4 some solely with
non-violent offenders,5 and some with no such restrictions.6 There
is a wide range of dispositional alternatives available to judes in
these cases,7 and an even wider range of judicial attitudes. And
the entire concept of "mental health courts" is certainly not without
controversy. 9
There is no question, however, that these courts offer a new
approach - perhaps a radically new approach - to the problems at
hand. They become even more significant because of their articu-
lated focus on dignity,' 0 as well as their embrace of therapeutic
jurisprudence, their focus on procedural justice, and their use of the
2. See, e.g., Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, The Future of Problem-
Solving Justice: An International Perspective, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 1, 3 (2010); Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving
Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW & POL'Y, 125, 127 (2001).
3. See JUSTICE CENTER: THE COUNSEL FOR STATE GOVERNMENTS,
http://www.consensusproject.org/programs?q mental+health+court&submit=G
o (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
4. See, e.g., Ursula Castellano, Courting Compliance: Case Managers
as "Double Agents" in the Mental Health Court, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 484,
490 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Julie Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First
Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the
System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1495 (2006).
6. See, e.g., E. Leah Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89
WASH. L. REV. 519, 521 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., From Referral to Disposition:
Case Processing in Seven Mental Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SC. & L. 215, 220
(2005).
8. See, e.g., Michael S. King, Should Problem-Solving Courts Be Solu-
tion-Focused Courts?, 80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1005 (2011).
9. See, e.g., Tammy Seltzer, A Misguided Attempt to Address the Crimi-
nal Justice System's Unfair Treatment of People with Mental Illness, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 570, 576 (2005).
10. See Ginger Lerner Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving Justice and
Promoting Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577, 593 (2010) (explaining dig-
nity in the context of mental health courts); see generally, infra text accompany-
ing notes 79-120.
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principles of restorative justice. ''It is time to restructure the dia-
logue about mental health courts and to begin to take seriously the
potential ameliorative impact of such courts on the ultimate dispo-
sition of all cases involving criminal defendants with mental dis-
abilities.
Mental health courts have come under attack from both the
right and the left. Of these attacks, I believe that the only relevant
one is that they may provide "false hope" to those who come be-
fore them. 12 I believe this is so because our "culture of blame" still
infects the entire criminal justice process, and that it continues to
demonize persons with mental illness for their status.'3 Until this is
remediated, there can be no assurances that mental health courts -
or any other such potentially-ameliorative alternative - will be ul-
timately "successful" (however we choose to define that term).
Two issues that, however, have not been the subject of much atten-
11. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their Promise
and Unanswered Questions, 52 LAW & PSYCHIATRY 457, 457-58 (2001) (dis-
cussing therapeutic jurisprudence in this context); Thomas L. Hafemeister,
Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Ap-
plying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better Respond to
Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 201-02
(2012) (on procedural justice); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR
DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 88-96
(2013) (on restorative justice). On the relationship between these three ap-
proaches, see id. at 96-98; Michael L. Perlin, Considering the "Alternative Ju-
risprudences" as a Tool of Social Change to Reduce Humiliation and Uphold
Dinity, "(2012),http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/PerlinNYI2Altern
ativeJurisprudences.pdf (paper presented to the 20th annual conference of the
Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies Network).
12. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 195, 204, 208, 210.
13. For a consideration of the many obstacles faced by such courts, see
Kevin Daly, Chrysanti Leon & Margaret Mahoney, Delaware Mental Health
Courts' Process Evaluation: Progressive Treatment and Systematic Obstacles,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1584835,
http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1584835 (last accessed Oct.
15, 2013; see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror": The
Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Dis-
abilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 606 (2008) (discussing the "culture of blame"
in a different mental disability law context and how bar committees on ethics
deal with lawyers with mental disabilities); see generally, Neil R. Feigenson,
Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1,
60 & n.258 (1997).
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tion must, I believe, be considered seriously: the quality of counsel
available to persons in mental health courts, and the question of
whether the individual at risk is competent to engage in mental
health court proceedings. These are both discussed extensively
below.
Much of the recent debate on mental health courts has fo-
cused either on empirical studies of recidivism or on theorization.14
These entire discussions, while important and helpful, bypass the
critical issue that is at the heart of this paper: do such courts pro-
vide additional dignity to the criminal justice process or do they
detract from that? Until we re-focus our sights on this issue, much
of the discourse on this topic remains wholly irrelevant.
In Part I of this paper, I will first discuss the underpinnings
of therapeutic jurisprudence. I will next, in Part II, look at the
structure of mental health courts, and will then raise the two con-
cerns about such courts that are, I believe, of particular relevance
to which I just alluded: questions of adequacy of counsel and the
competency of defendants to voluntarily participate in such court
proceedings. In Part III, I will then consider the role of dignity in
this process, and look to ways that therapeutic jurisprudence can
promote dignity in this context.
The title of this paper comes, in part from Bob Dylan's
song, Drifter 's Escape,'5 a song that combines revengeful elements
of the Old Testament with "a taste of Old West frontier justice." 6
The beginning of the song eerily tracks the circumstances of so
many defendants who eventually come before mental health
courts:
"Oh, help me in my weakness"
I heard the drifter say
As they carried him from the courtroom
And were taking him away
"My trip hasn't been a pleasant one
And my time it isn't long
14. See, e.g., Richard Wiener et al., A Testable Theory of Problem Solv-
ing Courts: Past Empirical and Legal Failures, 33 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
417 (2010).
15. BOB DYLAN, DRIFTER'S ESCAPE (Columbia 1967).
16. See OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB
DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 164 (2004).
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And I still do not know
What it was that I've done wrong"
Well, the judge, he cast his robe aside
A tear came to his eye
"You fail to understand," he said
"Why must you even try?"' 7
Certainly, many such defendants have had "trips" that were
not "pleasant ones," and often "still do not know/What it was that
[they had] done wrong." The judge, in a mental health court, does
symbolically "cast his robe" aside, as his role is so radically differ-
ent than it is in traditional criminal courts. But I hope, in contrast
to the situation depicted in this song, that judges do encourage liti-
gants to "[try] to understand" the court process. Because I believe
it is then, and only then, that some sort of remediation is possible.' 8
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE' 9
One of the most important legal theoretical developments
of the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth
of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).2 0 Initially employed in cases in-
volving individuals with mental disabilities, but subsequently ex-
panded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence pre-
17. DYLAN, supra note 15.
18. For those interested, I have seen Dylan sing this song only twice: On
May 10, 2003, at the Atlantic City (NJ) Hilton, and on August 9, 2003, in
Holmdel, NJ. He has not played it since November 27, 2005; see
http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/drifters-escape (last accessed, Jan. 22,
2013).
19. Perlin, supra note 1, at 196.
20. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE
LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK,
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 2D-3, at 534-41 (2d ed. 1998). Wex-
ler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental
Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental
Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32-33
(1992).
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sents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legisla-
tion, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.21 The ultimate aim of
therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, pro-
cedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance
their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process
principles.22 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David
Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: "the law's use of
'mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning
[cannot] impinge upon justice concerns."' 23 As I have written
elsewhere, "an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean
that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties." 24
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actu-
ally impacts people's lives," 25 and focuses on the law's influence
on emotional life and psychological well-being.26 It suggests that
21. See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great
Skill": How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity De-
fense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009). See Kate Diesfeld & Tan
Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES
AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Tan Freckelton & Kerry Anne Peterson
eds., 2006) for a transnational perspective.
22. Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks": San-
ism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683 (2003); Michael L. Perlin,
"And My Best Friend, My Doctor/ Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The
Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005) (Perlin, Best Friend); Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody
Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering the Sexual Autonomy
Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic
Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 481 (2008) (Perlin, Expecting
Rain).
23. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts
of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
24. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412
(2000) (Perlin, Healing); Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on
the Borderline": Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and
"Them, " 31 LOY. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
25. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives
on Dealing With Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
26. David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycho-
logical Soft Spots and Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Daniel P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce
J. Winick eds., 2000) (hereinafter STOLLE).
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"law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid im-
posing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when
consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring
about healing and wellness."27 By way of example, therapeutic
jurisprudence "aims to offer social science evidence that limits the
use of the incompetency label by narrowly defining its use and
minimizing its psychological and social disadvantage."28
In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of
topics through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not
limited to, all aspects of mental disability law, domestic relations
law, criminal law and procedure, employment law, gay rights law,
and tort law.29 As Ian Freckelton has noted, "it is a tool for gaining
a new and distinctive perspective utilizing sociopsychological in-
sights into the law and its applications."30 It is also part of a grow-
ing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more
humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues
collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully. ' These alternative
approaches optimize the psychological well-being of individuals,
relationships, and communities dealing with a legal matter, and
acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obli-
gations. In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance
rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been
described as "...a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of
law...a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to
27. Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Com-
mitment, in INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld &
Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
28. Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change In The Life Of The
Law: Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Make A Difference? 27 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 55, 65 (2003). See also Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Five Dilemmas to Ponder, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193 (1995) (for the
most thoughtful, sympathetic critique of TJ).
29. Michael L. Perlin, "Things Have Changed": Looking at Aon-
institutional Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. ScH.
L. REV. 535 (2002-03).
30. Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Mis-
represented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575,
582 (2008).
31. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within The
Comprehensive Law Movement, in STOLLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 365.
2013 7
Mental Health Law & Policy Journal
the practice of law...which emphasises psychological wellness
over adversarial triumphalism." 32 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence
supports an ethic of care.
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is
a commitment to dignity. Prof. Amy Ronner describes the "three
Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness, 34 arguing:
What 'the three Vs' commend is pretty basic: liti-
gants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell
their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels
that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard,
and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant
feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge
from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and
validation, they are more at peace with the outcome.
Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
participation, one in which the litigant experiences
the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily
partook in the very process that engendered the end
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects
their own lives can initiate healing and bring about
improved behavior in the future. In general, human
beings prosper when they feel that they are making,
or at least participating in, their own decisions.3 5
32. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an
Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329-30 (2001).
33. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal
Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006); David B. Wexler, Not
Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's
Concerns about Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48
B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Brookbanks, supra note 32; Gregory Baker, Do
You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A "Therapeutic" Approach to Enriching
Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006).
34. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Edu-
cation and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24
TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).
35. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Partici-
pation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
89, 94-95 (2002); see generally, AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
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2013 The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside 9
The question before us is this: do mental health courts promote a
vision that is consonant with the principles that Professor Ronner
sketches out for us in this paragraph?
THE STRUCTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 36
Mental health courts-one form of "problem-solving
courts"37  follow the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence, in
36. See generally, Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 107 (2003); Susan
Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 507 (2005). These courts are different from and independent
of traditional involuntary civil commitment courts, currently operating in many
states. For a critique of such courts, see Perlin, Healing, supra note 24, at 425-
26 ("[T]he overwhelming number of cases involving mental disability law issues
are 'litigated' in pitch darkness. Involuntary civil commitment cases are rou-
tinely disposed of in minutes behind closed courtroom doors."); Perlin, supra
note 1, at 209, discussing such courts that "I have observed across the nation, in
which persons with mental disabilities are regularly treated as third-class citi-
zens by (at the best) bored or (at the worst) malevolent trial judges." For a
thoughtful reconsideration of such courts in a transnational perspective, see
Terry Carney, David Tait & Fleur Beaupert, Pushing the Boundaries: Realising
Rights Through Mental Health Tribunal Processes?, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 329,
344 (2008).
37. Problem-solving courts grew out of an interdisciplinary approach to
address the underlying problem, not just the symptoms, of substance abuse,
domestic violence, child abuse, mental illness, and certain kinds of criminality.
See generally, Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving
Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1060 (2003). For overviews, see Michael
Dorf & Jeffrey Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institution-
alization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2003); Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin,
Theorizing Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 897 (2003). Included in this array are mental health courts, drug courts,
domestic violence courts, juvenile justice courts, sex offense courts, community
courts, truancy courts, veteran's courts, and homeless courts. For a full list, see
Deborah Chase & Peggy Hora, The Best Seat in the House: The Court Assign-
ment and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 209, 210 n.8 (2009). For a
critical reading on the ways that such courts "redefine" criminal justice, see
James L. Nolan, Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning
of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541 (2004). For a critical reading of the im-
pact on child welfare cases, see Jane Spinak, A Conversation About Problem-
Solving Courts: Take 2, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 113
(2010). For a consideration of an evidence-based model in one state, see
Melissa Aubin, The District of Oregon Reentry Court: An Evidence-Based
10 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal Vol. 3
an attempt "to improve justice by considering the therapeutic and
anti-therapeutic consequences that 'flow from substantive rules,
legal procedures, or the behavior of legal actors."38 They are de-
signed to deal holistically39 with people arrested (usually, but not
exclusively, for nonviolent misdemeanors) 40 when mental illness
Model, 27 FED. SENT'G. REP. 39 (2009). 1 have recently considered veterans
courts from a TJ perspective in Michael L. Perlin, "John Brown Went Off to
War": Considering Veterans' Courts as Problem-Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L.
REV. (2014).
38. Nancy Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents: Thinking Past the Nov-
elty of Mental Health Courts, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 431, 431 (2002);
see also, Randal Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor Mental Health Court Incorpo-
rates Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Restorative Justice, in
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE:
POLICY, PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATION 14-1, 14-3 (Jacqueline Moore ed., 2003)
("the fundamental principle underlying therapeutic jurisprudence is the selection
of options that promote health and are consistent with the values of the legal
system"). This is not a phenomenon limited to the United States. See, e.g.,
RICHARD D. SCIHNEIDER, HY BLOOM & MARK HEEREMA, MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS: DECRIMINALIZING THE MENTALLY III (2007); Sarah Ryan & Darius
Whelan, Diversion of Offenders with Mental Disorders: Mental Health Courts,
1 WEB J. CURR. LEG. ISSUES (2012), available at
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2012/issuel /ryanl.htmlhttp://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2012/issu
el/ryan1.html (Ireland); James Duffy, Problem-Solving Courts, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Constitution: If Two Is Company, Is Three a Crowd?, 35
MELB. U. L. REV. 394, 395 (2011).
39. See Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk
Managers: A New Conceptualization of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
93, 112 (2007).
40. Although, historically, most mental health courts typically heard only
cases of nonviolent offenders, see Grachek, supra note 5, at 1495, or only mis-
demeanor cases, see Castellano, supra note 4, at 490, some traditionally heard
felony cases as well, see Talesh, supra note 39, at 112. The trend is towards the
expansion of predicate case jurisdiction to include felonies, including violent
felonies, see Johnston, supra note 6, at 521. See, e.g., Andrew Wasicek, Mental
Illness and Crime: Envisioning a Public Health Strategy and Reimaging Mental
Health Courts, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 106, 135 (2012):
Mental health courts should accept violent felonies because it
is morally unsound to punish criminal behavior that is mainly
a product of mental disease.
With appropriate eligibility criteria, the new mental health court model would
encapsulate persons who are not shielded by the insanity defense - especially
persons from post-Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983) approving stringent statu-
tory measures governing releases of persons found not guilty by reason of insan-
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rather than criminality appears to be the precipitating reason for the
behavior in question.41 The mental health court judge42 seeks to
divert the individual from the criminal court in exchange for an
agreement to participate in community treatment,43 and to "help
participants avoid future criminal court involvement." 4 4
ity era, see 4 PERLIN, supra note 20, § 9B-2.3, at 290-98 (2d ed. 2002)]- but
should still be held blameless.
41. See generally, Stefan & Winick, supra note 36, relying on, inter alia,
Fritzler, supra note 38; Arthur Lurigio et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Ac-
tion: Specialized Courts for the Mentally Ill, 84 JUDICATURE 184 (2001); John
Petrila et al., Preliminary Observations from an Evaluation of the Broward
County Mental Health Court, 37 CT. REV. 14 (2002); Jan Freckelton, Mental
Health Review Tribunal Decision-making: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Lens,
10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 44 (2003); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS AND
PRACTITIONERS (2008). Positive and negative arguments about mental health
courts are collected in Andrea M. Odegaard, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The
Impact of Mental Health Courts on the Criminal Justice System, 83 N.D. L.
REV. 225, 250-54 (2007); see generally, Arthur J. Lurigio & Jessica Snowden,
Putting Therapeutic Jurisprudence into Practice: The Growth, Operations, and
Effectiveness of Mental Health Court, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 196 (2009).
42. Judges are the most common referral source of participants into di-
version programs (100% of survey respondents), with mental health personnel
(93% of survey respondents) coming in second, and attorneys (90% of survey
respondents) coming in a close third. For those agencies that chose the "other"
category, they indicated that referrals could come from families, service provid-
ers, law enforcement personnel, community agencies, and parole officers. Julie
B. Raines & Glenn T. Laws, Mental Health Court Survey, 45 CRIM. L. BULL.
627, 632 (2009).
43. Marjorie A. Silver, Lawyering and Its Discontents: Reclaiming
Meaning in the Practice of Law, 19 TOURO L. REV. 773, 803 (2004); see also
Talesh, supra note 39, at 110; Camille Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling
Race: Policing Race and Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2010)
(on the necessity of diversion); John Cummings, The Cost of Crazy: How
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Mental Health Courts Lower Incarceration
Costs, Reduce Recidivism, and Improve Public Safety, 56 LoY. L. REV. 279, 306
(2010) (discussing mental health courts' "palpable results"). On the question of
whether this diversion is swifter than traditional court processing, see Allison
Redlich et al., Is Diversion Swift: Comparing Mental Health Court and Tradi-
tional Criminal Justice Processing, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 420 (2012) (al-
though diversion may not be swifter, that may be less important than the fact of
diversion itself).
44. Kirk Kimber, Mental Health Courts - Idaho's Best Kept Secret, 45
IDAHO L. REV. 249, 270 (2008); see also, Brenda Desmond & Paul Lenz, Men-
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Mental health courts are premised on team approaches; 45
representatives from justice and treatment agencies assist the judge
in screening offenders to determine whether they would present a
risk of violence if released to the community, in devising appropri-
ate treatment plans, and in supervising and monitoring the individ-
ual's performance in treatment.46 The mental health court judge
functions as part of a mental health team that decides whether the
individual has treatment needs and can be safely released to the
community. 47 The team formulates a treatment plan, and a court-
employed case manager and court monitor track the individual's
participation in the treatment program, and submit periodic reports
to the judge concerning his or her progress. Participants are re-
quired to report to the court periodically so that the judge can
monitor treatment compliance, and additional status review hear-
48
ings are held on an as-needed basis.
To serve effectively in this sort of court setting, the judge
needs to develop enhanced interpersonal skills and awareness of a
variety of psychological techniques that can help the judge to per-
suade the individual to accept treatment and motivate him or her to
participate effectively in it. 49 She must be able to build trust and
tal Health Courts: An Effective Way of Treating Offenders with Serious Mental
Illness, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 525, 526 (2010). On the
creation of juvenile mental health courts, see Daniel M. Filler & Austin Smith,
The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951, 971 n. 105 (2006).
45. See e.g., Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 41, at 210; Marlee E.
Moore & Virginia A. Hiday, Mental Health Court Outcomes: A Comparison of
Re-arrest and Re-arrest Severity Between Mental Health Court and Traditional
Court Participants, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2006).
46. Winick, supra note 36, at 125-26. On the role of jail as a potential
sanction in the cases of non-compliant defendants, see Allison Redlich et al.,
Patterns and Practice in Mental Health Courts: A National Survey, 30 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 347, 355-56 (2006).
47. On the often-conflicting roles of case managers in mental health
courts, see Castellano, supra note 4, at 490-91.
48. Stefan & Winick, supra note 36, at 520-21.
49. Winick, supra note 36, at 126 (citing Carrie Petrucci, Respect as a
Component in the Judge-Defendant Interaction in a Specialized Domestic Vio-
lence Court that Utilizes Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 263
(2002)). On the "collateral institutional authority of the judge" in mental health
courts, see Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Re-entry
Courts, 30 FED. SENT'G REP. 127, 128 (2008). On the way that judgmental de-
scriptive language can adversely affect the work of such courts in civil cases, see
1 2 Vol. 3
The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside
manage risk.50 These skills include the ability to convey empathy
and respect, to communicate effectively with the individual, to lis-
ten to what the individual has to say, thereby fulfilling the individ-
ual's need for voice and validation, to earn the individual's trust
and confidence, and to engage in motivational interviewing and
various other techniques designed to encourage the individual to
accept treatment and comply with it.51
These courts provide "nuanced" approaches, 52 and may
signal a "fundamental shift" in the criminal justice system.53 Ac-
cording to former Judge Randal Fritzler, a successful mental health
court thus needs: 1) a therapeutic environment and dedicated team;
2) an environment free from stigmatizing labels; 3) opportunities
for deferred sentences and diversion away from the criminal sys-
tem; 4) the least restrictive alternatives; 5) decision-making that is
interdependent; 6) coordinated treatment; and 7) a review process
that is meaningful.54 It is essential that such courts be free of the
"pretextual dishonesty"55 that is so often the hallmark of judicial
proceedings in cases of individuals with mental disabilities. 56
Ian Freckelton, Distractors and Distressors in Involuntary Status Decision-
Making, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L . 88 (2005).
50. Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony
Mental Health Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 587 (2005).
51. For a thoughtful critique of mental health courts, see Johnston, supra
note 6. On the role of the legislature in ensuring the success of such courts, see
Sheila Moheb, Jamming the Revolving Door: Legislative Setbacks for Mental
Health Court Systems in Virginia, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 29 (2010).
52. Patricia C. McManus, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Approach to
Guardianship of Persons with Mild Cognitive Impairment, 36 SETON HALL L.
REV. 591, 598 (2006).
53. Developments in the Law -The Law of Mental Illness: Mental
Health Courts and the Trend Toward a Rehabilitative Justice System, 121
HARV.L.REV. 1168, 1177 (2008).
54. Randal B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health
Court, reprinted in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 118 (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler
eds., 2003), and Fritzler, supra note 38, at 14-18 ("The [mental health court]
must avoid contributing negative stigma to its clients"). See also Georgia Lee
Sims, The Criminalization of Mental Illness: How Theoretical Failures Create
Real Problems in the Criminal Justice System, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1079
(2009).
55. 1 define "pretextuality" as the ways in which courts accept (either
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest
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Some defense attorneys fear that problem-solving courts, in
general, "arm twist ... [their clients] into diversion with a condi-
tion of entry being that they take a plea, and/or that the effective
treatment is raised above the least restrictive treatment.57 By way
of example, Cait Clarke and James Neuhard raise this potential
dilemma:
For example, a defense attorney may devote less at-
tention to the desires of the defendant, focusing
more on the goals of the 'team' (including the de-
fense attorney, prosecutor, judge, and probation of-
ficer). An illustration of this would be where the
'team' decides the defendant requires in-custody
treatment, although the defendant has previously
told the defense attorney that she does not want to
participate in an in-custody treatment program.58
Skeptics argue that MHCs are too dependent on the aura of
the charismatic judge. 59 However, we do have a database of re-
search on the way that persons whose cases have been heard before
one MHC, the one run by Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren in Ft. Lau-
derdale, FL and that database is spectacular.6 0 Basically, it tells us
(and frequently meretricious) decision-making. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin,
"Simplify You, Classify You": Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability
Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2009).
56. See, e.g., Jan Freckelton, Mental Health Review Tribunal Decision-
making: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Lens, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 44,
59 (2003) (citing Michael L. Perlin, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000)); Michael L. Perlin, Preface to INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
ON CIVIL COMMITMENT xxxiii (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003); Ian
Freckelton, Ideological Divarication in Civil Commitment Decision-making, 10
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 390, 395 (2003).
57. Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, "From Day One ": Who's in Control
as Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 11, 29 (2004).
58. Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 57, at 29 n.49.
59. A caution on relying on such charisma in the context of other prob-
lem solving courts is raised in Jane Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT.
REV. 258, 269-71(2008).
60. On the difficulties generally in assessing mental health courts, see
Nancy Wolff & Wendy Pogorzelski, Measuring the Effectiveness of Mental
Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 539 (2005).
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that defendants before Judge Lerner-Wren report a higher score on
a dignity scale (and a lower score on a perceived coercion scale)61
than any group of criminal defendants who have ever been stud-
i62ied. In short, the actual, real life experiences of the litigants in
cases before Judge Lerner-Wren demonstrate that one MHC can be
a non-coercive, dignified experience that provides procedural jus-
tice and therapeutic jurisprudence to those before it.63
61. On the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in dealing with coercion in
the mental health court process, see Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Approach to Dealing with Coercion in the Mental Health System, 15
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 25 (2008). On the significance of the presence of
dignity in mental health tribunals in Australia, see David Tait, The Ritual Envi-
ronment of the Mental Health Tribunal Hearing: Inquiries and Reflections, 10
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 91 (2003). On dignitiarian issues in general, see
PERLIN, supra note 11, at 99-108.
62. See Norman G. Poythress et al., Perceived Coercion and Procedural
Justice in the Broward Mental Health Court, 25 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 517
(2002). Judge Wren discusses her judicial philosophy in Wren, supra note 10.
On how levels of emotional intelligence correlate with judicial success in prob-
lem-solving courts, see James Duffy, Problem-Solving Courts, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Constitution, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 394 (2011); Michael
King, Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and the Rise of the Emo-
tionally Intelligent Justice, 35 MELB. L. REV. 1096 (2008). On the role of re-
storative justice, see generally PERLIN, supra note 11, at 88-96, in problem-
solving courts, see Megan Stephens, Lessons from the Front Lines in Canada's
Restorative Justice Experiment: The Experience of Sentencing Judges, 33
QUEEN'S L.J. 19, 63-64 (2007).
63. See Judith Kaye, Lecture 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 743, 748 (2007)
("[M]ental health courts, which . . . divert defendants from jail to treatment,
reconnect them, where possible, with family and friends who care whether they
live or die, . . . restore their greatest loss-their sense of human dignity") (author
former Chief Judge of New York Court of Appeals); Hafemeister, Garner &
Bath, supra note 11, at 201-02 ("[P]rocedural justice is a key to the success of
mental health courts"). For a less sanguine attitude (based on a visit to a mental
health court in Washington, D.C.), see Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration
Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEo L.J. 1587,
1613-14 (2012) ("[A]ctual therapeutic or other effects of this engagement re-
main uncertain"). On the important related issue of the impact of such courts on
racial and ethnic minorities, see Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-
Solving Courts, 21 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 27, 46-47 (2009) (research by National
Center for State Courts reveals that African-Americans and Latinos show more
support for practices and procedures promoted by problem-solving courts than
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Two Concerns
I do have two concerns that have not been the focus of
much scholarly attention. It is these two concerns that temper my
full enthusiasm for mental health courts, especially in the context
of the issues I focus on in this paper, but I believe that they can be
remediated: the lack of concern paid to the question of competency
in the mental health court process,64 and the lack of concern paid to
the question of the quality of counsel made available to individuals
in the mental health court process.
Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues point out what
should be obvious: Given the impaired cognition that accompanies
many mental disorders, "there is little evidence to suggest that
mental health courts ensure that prospective candidates are compe-
tent to accept [the] plea bargains [into which many enter], as re-
quired by constitutional law."65 Allison Redlich similarly worries
that "the very types of people MHCs were designed for may be the
people who do not fully comprehend the purpose, requirements,
and roles in the courts." 66 Subsequent research done by Redlich
and her colleagues, in fact, reveals that the majority of defendants
at two mental courts lacked "nuanced information" about the trial
do whites). On the impact of such courts on immigrants, see Alina Das, Immi-
grants and Problem-Solving Courts, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 308 (2008).
64. See generally, Kathleen Stafford & Dustin Wygant, The Role of
Competency to Stand Trial in Mental Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SC. & L. 245
(2005) (over three-quarters of potential mental health court defendants in one
Ohio court were found to be incompetent).
65. Steven Erickson et al., Variations in Mental Health Courts: Chal-
lenges, Opportunities, and a Call for Caution, 42 COMM. MENTAL HEALTH J.
335, 339 (2006); see also Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin' Away? Will Our Na-
tion's Mental Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?,
22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 828-29 (2004) ("[O]ne of the first orders of busi-
ness is to determine whether the individual is competent . . . '[E]ven among
those deemed competent to stand trial, serious questions may be raised about the
ability of persons to truly understand the choices being presented and the conse-
quences of those choices"'), quoting John S. Goldkamp & Cheryl Irons-Guynn,
Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Emerging Judicial Strate-
gies For the Mentally Ill in the Criminal Caseload: Mental Health Courts in
Fort Lauderdale, Seattle, San Bernardino, and Anchorage xi (Apr. 2000), avail-
able at http:// www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/bja/I 82504.pdf.
66. Allison Redlich, Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent?, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 605, 616 (2005).
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process and that a minority of defendants had "impairments in le-
gal competence"; 67 the researchers concluded, however, that there
were some indications that "the clients in the [mental health courts]
in this study made knowing, intelligent and voluntary enrollment
decisions."68 Clearly, "a thorough evaluation of the offender's
mental competence ... is essential" in the mental health court proc-
ess. 69 Judge Michael Finkle and several colleagues have recom-
mended that "competency courts" be created as subspecialty courts
within mental health courts to "improve the competency process
and reduce the unnecessary time that mentally ill persons spend in
jail,"7 0 but there are no signs that this recommendation is being
acted upon.
What about counsel? I have written often about the scan-
dalous lack of effective counsel made available to persons with
mental disabilities in the civil commitment and criminal justice
processes. 7 What is the quality of counsel available to litigants in
mental health courts?
67. Allison Redlich et al., Enrollment in Mental Health Courts: Volun-
tariness, Knowingness, and Adjudicative Incompetence, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 91, 91 (2010).
68. Id. at 101. On the other hand, they noted:
[I]ndividuals making important legal and treatment decisions
should have more than a basic knowledge of procedures, re-
quirements, and consequences, particularly given that there are
sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, MHCs must now ask:
What information do we want MHC participants to have at the
time of enrollment and how can we ensure that the informa-
tion is meaningfully understood, particularly the complicated
nuances?
Id. at 103.
69. Christin E. Keele, Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: The Challeng-
ing Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 UMKC
L. REV. 193, 202 (2002).
70. Michael J. Finkle et al., Competency Courts: A Creative Solution for
Restoring Competency to the Competency Process, 27 BEHAV. SC. & L. 767
(2009). However, with the exception of one student note, see Nicholas Rosinia,
How 'Reasonable' Has Become Unreasonable: A Proposal for Rewriting the
Lasting Legacy of Jackson v. Indiana, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 673, 693 n.115
(2012), this suggestion has heretofore gone unnoticed in the legal literature.
71. See Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your
Funeral, My Trial": A Global Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil
Commitment Cases, and Its Implications for Clinical Legal Education, 28
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Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues have expressed
concern "as to whether defendants in mental health courts receive
adequate representation by their attorneys." 72 Terry Carney charac-
terizes the assumption that adequate counsel will be present at
hearings to guarantee liberty values as a "false hope."73 Henry
Dlugacz and Christopher Wimmer summarize the salient issues:
It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust
in an attorney unless she is confident that he is act-
ing in accordance with her wishes. The client with
mental illness may already doubt the attorney's loy-
alty. This risk is exacerbated when the attorney is
appointed by the court. The client may wonder
whether the attorney has been assigned in order to
zealously represent her, or instead to facilitate her
processing through the legal system . . . . There are
strong personal disincentives to thorough prepara-
tion, even for the committed attorney. There are
also institutional pressures: The attorney who de-
pends on the goodwill of others in the system (e.g.,
WASH. U. J. L. & SOC'L POL'Y 241, 241 (2008) ("If there has been any constant
in modern mental disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the near-
universal reality that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary
civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective"); Michael L. Perlin, "The
Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 207-08 (1996)
("Nearly twenty years ago, when surveying the availability of counsel to men-
tally disabled litigants, President Carter's Commission on Mental Health noted
the frequently substandard level of representation made available to mentally
disabled criminal defendants. Nothing that has happened in the past two decades
has been a palliative for this problem"). See generally, MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 123-38 (2013).
72. Erickson et al., supra note 65, at 340.
73. Terry Carney, The Mental Health Service Crisis of Aeoliberalism -
An Antipodean Perspective, 31 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 101, 111 (2008). See
also Terry Carney, Best Interests or Legal Rectitude? Australian Mental Health
Tribunal Stakeholder & Case Flow Implications (paper presented at Irish Men-
tal Health Commission Conference 'Mental Health Act 2001-Promoting Best
Interest, ' Dublin, November 2009), manuscript at 33 ("The issue of legal advo-
cacy before [mental health tribunals] is a vexed one.") (paper on file with
author). See also Perlin, supra note 37 (discussing this same issue in the context
of veterans courts).
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judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull his
punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credi-
bility for future interactions (which he would put to
use for his future clients). Judges want cases re-
solved.74
Some solutions have been offered. Bruce Winick has ar-
gued that "lawyers should adequately counsel their clients about
the advantages and disadvantages of accepting diversion to mental
health court." 7 5 As a result, judges and defense counsel in mental
health courts should ensure that defendants receive dignity and
respect, are given a sense of voice and validation, and are treated
with fairness and good faith." 76 Turning to the legal education
clinical context, David Wexler has suggested that students might
"consider the kind of dialogue a lawyer might have with a client
about the pros and cons of opting into a [drug treatment court] or
mental health court."77 It is essential that counsel has "a back-
74. Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Represent-
ing Clients with Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. Louis
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 353-54 (2011). On the need for lawyers taking a
TJ approach to view their clients "holistically," see King, supra note 63, at
1122.
75. Stefan & Winick, supra note 36, at 523.
76. Id at 516. See also Winick, supra note 36; Stefan & Winick, supra
note 36, at 510-11, 520 (comments by Professor Winick).
77. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743, 750 (2005).
See Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, Making the Case: Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Problem Solving Practices Positively Impact Clients, Justice Systems and
Communities They Serve, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 781, 807 (2005) (discussing
the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in clinical legal education). I consider dia-
logues that defense lawyers might have with their clients in incompetency status
or insanity defense cases in Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn To Ever Be Gov-
erned By Enforced Insanity ": Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the
Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity Cases, 33
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475 (2010). On the parallel set of issues raised in the
context of drug courts, compare David B. Wexler, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743,
750 (2005), see Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 57, at 29 (considering a parallel
set of issues in drug courts) ("In addition to concerns about net-widening, some
defense attorneys fear that these courts and the defense attorneys who practice in
them are forcing their clients into the drug courts, arm twisting them into diver-
sion with a condition of entry being that they take a plea, and/or that the effec-
tive treatment is raised above the least restrictive treatment"); see generally,
2013 19
20 Mental Health Law & Policy Journal Vol. 3
ground in mental health issues and in communicating with indi-
viduals who may be in crisis."
ON DIGNITY79
Introduction
Dignity is at the core of therapeutic jurisprudence,80 and it
also is the key underpinning of mental health courts. 8 Prof. Carol
Sanger suggests that dignity means that people "possess an intrin-
sic worth that should be recognized and respected," and that they
should not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent
with that intrinsic worth.82 Treating people with dignity and respect
makes them more likely to view procedures as fair and the motives
Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway: Musings of a Public Defender
about Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37
(2001). For an overview of drug courts, see also Peggy Hora & Theodore Stal-
cup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of the
Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717 (2008). For a recent
article by sitting trial judges contrasting mental health courts and drug courts,
see Anne Harper & Michael J. Finkle, Mental Health Courts, 51 JUDGES' J. 4
(2012). For a critique of juvenile drug courts, see Jason Rayne, An Exposition of
the Effectiveness of and the Challenges Plaguing Maine's Juvenile Drug Treat-
ment Court Program, 62 ME. L. REV. 649 (2010). For a consideration of family
drug courts, see Janet York et al., Family Drug Treatment Courts and Social
Determinants of Health, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 137 (2012). On the question as to
whether drug courts should be operated as civil rather than criminal courts, see
Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving from
a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299 (2010).
78. Wexler, supra note 77, at 750.
79. See generally, Perlin, supra note 11, at 99-108 & 217-39; Michael L.
Perlin, Understanding the Intersection between International Human Rights and
Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191 (Bruce Arrigo & Heather
Bersot, eds., 2013).
80. See Christina A. Zawisza & Adela Beckerman, Two Heads Are Better
Than One: The Case-Based Rationale for Dual Disciplinary Teaching in Child
Advocacy Clinics, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 631 (2006); David C. Yamada, Hu-
man Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 523 (2009).
81. Perlin, supra note 1, at 209 (relying on, inter alia, Poythress et al.,
supra note 62).
82. Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hear-
ings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 415 (2009).
The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside
behind law enforcement's actions as well meaning.13 What indi-
viduals want most "is a process that allows them to participate,
seeks to merit their trust, and treats them with dignity and re-
spect."84 All concepts of human rights have their basis in some
understanding of human dignity.8 5 Dignity has been characterized
as one of "those very great political values that defines our consti-
tutional morality." 86
The legal process upholds human dignity by allowing the
litigant-including the criminal defendant-to tell his own story.
A notion of individual dignity, "generally articulated through con-
cepts of autonomy, respect, equality, and freedom from undue
government interference, was at the heart of a jurisprudential and
moral outlook that resulted in the reform, not only of criminal pro-
cedure, but of the various institutions more or less directly linked
with the criminal justice system, including juvenile courts, prisons,
and mental institutions."88 Fair process norms such as the right to
counsel "operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state
power to ensure that the individual suspect is treated with dignity
and respect." 89 Dignity concepts are expansive; a Canadian Su-
preme Court case has declared that disenfranchisement of incarcer-
ated persons violated their dignity interests. 90 By way of example,
83. Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for
Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1474 (2009).
84. Luther Munford, The Peacemaker Test: Designing Legal Rights to
Reduce Legal Warfare, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 377, 393 (2007).
85. Buddhism and Human Dignity, SGI QUARTERLY, (July 2000) avail-
able at http://www.sgi.org/buddhism/buddhist-concepts/buddhism-and-human-
dignity.html.
86. William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47, 71
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
87. Katherine Kruse, The Human Dignity of Clients, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1343, 1353 (2008).
88. Eric Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Prom-
ise ofJudicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1569 n.463 (2004).
89. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The
Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200
(1983).
90. Sauv6 v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, discussed in Michael Pinard,
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 464 (2010).
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"the moral dignity of the criminal process would be frustrated if
grossly incompetent defendants were permitted to plead guilty." 91
One of the critical functions of counsel is to "protect the dignity
and autonomy of a person on trial."92 Perhaps counterintuitively to
much of the lay public, dignity may trump "truth" as a core value
of the criminal justice system.93 In short, dignity inquiries perme-
ate the criminal justice system, especially as the concept applies to
persons with mental disabilities.
Dignity must also be contextualized with what I call "san-
ism" and "pretextuality." Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the
same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause,
and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 94 It permeates mental disability
law, affecting all participants in the mental disability law system:
litigants, fact-finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses. Its
corrosive effects have warped mental disability law jurispru-
dence. 9 5 Along with pretextuality, 96 it has controlled, and continues
91. Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead
Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 571, 593 (1995).
92. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also, e.g., Philip Halpern, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client
Relationship: An Interest Analysis of Rights and Remedies, 32 BUFF. L. REV.
127, 172 (1983) ("The right to counsel embraces two separate interests: reliable
and fair determinations in criminal proceedings, and treatment of defendants
with dignity and respect regardless of the effect on the outcome of criminal pro-
ceedings.").
93. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO
L. Rv. 1, 52 (2010). On the application of human dignity principles to limit the
scope of criminalization of victimless crimes (specifically, drug offenses), see
generally, Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human
Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 TENN.
L. REV. 291 (2013).
94. Perlin, Expecting Rain supra note 22, at 506.
95. Id. at 487.
96. See supra note 55. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked
Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental
Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 18 (1999)
(footnotes omitted):
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected
both in the testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of
legislators and fact-finders. Experts frequently testify in accor-
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to control, modern mental disability law.97 A careful examination
of mental disability law reveals that judges are often pretextual
because of their own "instrumental, functional, normative and phi-
losophical" dissatisfaction with non-sanist constitutional decisions
that grant a measure of dignity to persons with mental disabili-
ties.98
I believe that therapeutic jurisprudence is the best tool
available to us to infuse the legal process with needed dignity. 99
The expanded use of dignity-providing mental health courts would
allow for diversion of more of this cohort of defendants out of the
criminal court process (and ultimately, out of destructive correc-
tional facilities) into alternative placements where it is more likely
they will be treated with at least a modicum of dignity.' 00
dance with their own self-referential concepts of 'morality' and
openly subvert statutory and case law criteria that impose rigor-
ous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment or that
articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompe-
tency to stand trial finding. Often this testimony is further
warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of
us-succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive
devices in their thinking, and employ such heuristic gambits as
the vividness effect or attribution theory in their testimony.
Id. at 18.
97. Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific:
The Need for a Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 31
(2012).
98. Michael L. Perlin, "Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears": Giving
Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315, 344 (2003) (quoting, in part, Michael L.
Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All" Ex-
posing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1258
(1997)).
99. Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, "Johnny's in the Base-
ment/Mixing Up His Medicine ": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teach-
ing, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 354 n.93 (2000) ("Therapeutic jurisprudence
may also lend dignity to the voice of persons subordinated even by those who
profess to represent the powerless."); Perlin, supra note 11, at 217-39.
100. "The purpose of the mental health court is to insure that mentally ill
people are treated with dignity and provided with the opportunity for treatment
while at the same time protecting the public's safety" and "preventing criminali-
zation of the mentally ill." See Faraci, supra note 65, at 824.
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The arbitrary limitation in some mental health courts cut-
ting off eligibility either for persons who are charged with commit-
ting felonies or crimes of "violence"' 0' self-evidently greatly limits
the cohort of individuals who can be diverted to such courts.' 02
Absent any empirical justification for these limitations - and none
has been offered'0 3 _ it makes no sense to perpetuate these cut
offs,10 4 especially in the context of the vast discretion traditionally
vested in prosecutors with regards to the charging process.'os
To a great extent, prosecutors' decisions follow the initial
judgments of police officers. But the near-boundless discretion
vested in police decision-making makes this counterproductive. By
way of example, consider the factual settings in the Supreme Court
cases of Addington v. Texas' 06 and Jones v. United States.'07
101. See Grachek, supra note 5, at 1495; Castellano, supra note 4, at 490.
Misdemeanors are accepted by 87% of mental health courts responding to a
recent survey; 77% of such courts accept non-violent felonies, and over one-
third of the courts accept violent felonies. Raines & Laws, supra note 42, at
630.
102. One rarely-discussed but powerfully-important issue is that of
"clutchability," a consideration of "when the state has legitimate hold or power
over an individual." On the concept of "clutchability" in general in criminal
law, see, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Crime, Clutchability, and Individuated Treatment,
in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 252
(1970). On the concept in this context of mental health courts, see Chelsea
Davis, With the Best of Intentions, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. 101 (2013).
103. The rationale appears to be purely political: "Violent offenders have
traditionally been excluded from mental health courts because of public outcry
to the heinous nature of their crimes vis-a-vis the public's empathetic perception
of mentally ill, nonviolent offenders." Jared Hodges & Brett Williams, Courts,
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 303 (2011) (emphasis added). Of course, not all
felonies are remotely "heinous." See infra notes 106-11 accompanying text.
104. See Wasicek, supra note 40, at 139 ("Mental health courts should
accept [cases of defendants charged with] violent felonies").
105. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971); Conor Clark & Austin
Sarat, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits
of Law, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 387, 389 (2008).
106. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (burden of proof in civil
commitment case at least "clear and convincing evidence").
107. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (constitutionally accept-
able to provide insanity acquittees with fewer procedural due process protections
in a retention hearing than civil committees).
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Addington, who was subjected to the involuntary civil commit-
ment process, had originally been apprehended following an al-
leged "assault by threat" on his mother.'08 Jones, for whom an in-
sanity defense plea had been entered, had originally been appre-
hended after he allegedly attempted to shoplift a jacket in a down-
town Washington, D.C. department store.109 Addington's acts ap-
pear to have been more serious (and more "dangerous") than did
Jones's; yet, for undisclosed and unarticulated extra-judicial rea-
sons, Addington was brought into the mental health system while
Jones was arrested and thus brought into the criminal justice sys-
tem.' 10 Notwithstanding the fact that Jones was charged with a fel-
ony (attempted petit larceny [shoplifting]), it makes no sense to
suggest that this was the sort of "heinous" crime that would auto-
matically disallow diversion to a mental health court."'
Scholars and practitioners who have written about mental
health courts frequently stress the need for "creativity" in the use
of such courts as a tool for enhancing the decision to divert a de-
fendant from traditional criminal court.112 In such courts, judges
must seek to craft "creative judicial responses to offending conduct
that address the root causes of that conduct in the hope that, in the
end, the prevalence of such conduct will subside."'"3 An expansion
of these courts will best serve the population under consideration
in this work. Consider here the thoughts of Gerald Nora, an Illinois
state's attorney:
108. Addington, 441 U.S. at 420.
109. Jones, 463 U.S. at 359.
110. 1 discuss the implications of this in Perlin, supra note 96, at 30 n.158.
111. Id. at 29-30 ("Untrammeled discretion vested in police officers leads
to inexplicable disjunctions in mental disability law developments.").
112. See, e.g., Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 77, at 781 (on how "creative"
advocacy can achieve diversion or alternatives to incarceration in this context);
Sandra F. Cannon & Joseph Krake, Mental Health Diversion Alternatives to
Jail: Thirteen Pilot Programs Funded by ODMH in April 2000: Where Are They
Now and What Have We Learned?, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2004) ("Di-
version programs that pool resources from different systems-mental health,
substance abuse and criminal justice-and those that utilize creative strategies to
approach housing and other treatment issues will undoubtedly fare the best").
113. Raymond H. Brescia, Beyond Balls and Strikes: Towards a Problem-
Solving Ethic in Foreclosure Proceedings, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305, 315
(2009).
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The bottom line is that mental health courts are he-
roic efforts to bring some justice to a severely un-
derserved population. It is society's failure, not the
criminal justice system's failure, if these courts con-
tinue to be the brightest candles in the darkness we
have imposed upon the mentally ill. We are prose-
cuting the mentally ill as criminals. And many men-
tal health workers are prevented from doing their
jobs unless they are partnered with lawyers, proba-
tion officers, and court orders. And our preferred
patients are those who commit crimes. We let the
law-abiding suffer alone."14
Nora's indictment is a powerful one: "If we persist in prosecuting
mentally ill defendants in willful ignorance of their medical prob-
lems, our system will stand as an asylum whose keepers are as de-
luded as the inmates."" 5 The expansion of mental health courts -
following the models of Judge Wren,'6 Judge Matthew D'Emic,
Judge Michael Finkle," 8 and others" 9 - is a major component in
the prescription of dignity for this population, and, importantly, as
* * * *120
a way to minimize sanism.
114. Gerald Nora, Prosecutor as "Nurse Ratched"? Misusing Criminal
Justice as Alternative Medicine, 22 CRIM. JUST. 18, 22 (Fall 2007).
115. Id.
116. See Wren, supra note 10, at 593 (explaining dignity in the context of
mental health courts).
117. See Matthew J. D'Emic, The Promise of Mental Health Courts, 22
CRIM. JUST. 24 (Fall 2007).
118. See Anne Harper & Michael J. Finkle, Mental Health Courts, 51
JUDGES' J. 4 (Spring 2012).
119. E.g., Judge Stephanie Rhoades of Alaska; see Shauhin Talesh, Mental
Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk Managers: A New Conceptualization of
the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 115 (2007) (discussing Judge
Rhoades).
120. See Sana Loue, The Involuntary Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill
Persons in the United States and Romania: A Comparative Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL MED. 211, 235 n.120 (2002) ("sanist biases may be reduced through the
establishment of mental health courts, with a judiciary trained to be sensitive to
such issues") (citing Elaine M. Andrews & Stephanie Rhoades, Anchorage Dis-
trict Court Initiates Two New Programs: People with Disabilities Offered Alter-
natives in Judicial Proceeding, 23 ALASKA BAR RAG I (May/June 1999)). 1
discuss this proposition in Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 22, at 748.
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CONCLUSION
Mental health courts - when structured properly and when
chaired by a judge who "buys in" to the TJ model - are perfect
exemplars of the practical utility of therapeutic jurisprudence. 12 1
The promotion and creation of such courts are consistent with TJ's
aims and aspirations, 122 especially where litigants are given the
"voice" that TJ demands.123 They are grounded 24 and rooted 25 in
TJ; they reflect TJ "theory in practice."126 Although both of these
121. See Kate Diesfeld & Brian McKenna, The Therapeutic Intent of the
New Zealand Mental Health Review Tribunal, 13 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L.
100 (2006); Kate Diesfeld & Brian McKenna, The Unintended Impact of the
Therapeutic Intentions of the New Zealand Mental Health Review Tribunal?
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives, 14 J. L. & MED. 566 (2007); see also
Jelena Popovic, Court Process and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Have We
Thrown the Baby out with the Bathwater?, http://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/
issues/special/court process.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). But see Johnston,
supra note 6, at 521 (arguing thoughtfully that therapeutic jurisprudence is not
an adequate basis upon which to support mental health courts). I disagree with
Prof. Johnston because I believe she fails to acknowledge the due process un-
derpinnings of TJ theory (see id. at 533) ("Therapeutic jurisprudence offers no
opinion-in general or in specific instances-as to whether therapeutic consid-
erations should be valued more heavily than autonomy, fairness, accuracy, con-
sistency, perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system, public safety, or a
host of other values"). I believe this is simply not so. See Michael L. Perlin,
"Justice's Beautiful Face": Bob Sadoff and the Redemptive Promise of Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence, 40 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 267 (2012) (quoting Perlin,
Healing, supra note 24, at 412 ("An inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not
mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties.")).
122. See Leroy Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health
Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offend-
ers, 24 SEATTLE L. REV. 373, 446-47 (2000).
123. Nicola Ferencz & James McGuire, Mental Health Review Tribunals
in the UK: Applying a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 37 COURT REV.
48, 51 (2000).
124. James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving
and the Meaning ofJustice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2003).
125. Wasicek, supra note 40, at 126; John Cummings, The Cost of Crazy:
How Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Mental Health Courts Lower Incarceration
Costs, Reduce Recidivism, and Improve Public Safety, 56 LOY. L. REV. 279,
280-81 (2010).
126. Michael Codben & Ron Albers, Beyond the Squabble: Putting the
Tenderloin Community Justice Center in Context, 7 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L. J. 53, 56 (2010).
Mental Health Law & Policy Journal
issues - counsel and competence - are extraordinarily critical
ones, I do not believe there is any evidence that mental health
courts cannot be redirected to confront them and to craft creative
solutions to the problems raised.
Mental health courts offer a new way of considering the
linkage between mental disability and the criminal justice process.
These courts are not without controversy, but the research appears
to reveal, in general, a robust relationship between the operation of
well-run mental health courts and enhanced dignity. I believe that
the expansion of such courts - keeping in mind the due process
foundation of therapeutic jurisprudence - is the best way to insure
dignity to persons with mental disabilities in the criminal justice
system.
In Drifter 's Escape, the judge casts aside his robe as he
presides over a case about which the defendant has no understand-
ing. Later in the song, Dylan tells us:
"Outside, the crowd was stirring. You could hear it
from the door." 127
Certainly, public vengeance is a key component of our criminal
justice policies as they apply to persons with mental disabilities.128
The song concludes with the drifter escaping after a bolt of
lightning strikes the courthouse.129 This is not a particularly valu-
able strategy - hoping for lightning to strike - for lawyers repre-
senting persons with mental disabilities. The expansion of dignity-
providing mental health courts is, I think, a much better option.
127. DYLAN, supra note 15.
128. In discussing the roots of the public enmity toward the insanity de-
fense and insanity defense pleaders, I have noted, "By nurturing emotions of
vengeance, the punishment of criminals 'furthers social solidarity and protects
against the terrifying anxiety that the forces of good might not triumph against
the forces of evil after all."' Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Sepa-
rated You From Me": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of
Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1386 (1997)
(quoting Bernard Diamond, From Durham to Brawner, A Futile Journey, 1973
WASH. U. L. Q. 109, 110 (1973)).
129. DYLAN, supra note 15.
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